Container image and supply-chain policy

The supported container packages the Python CLI with a documented Debian FFmpeg build. It runs as UID/GID 10001, uses no shell entrypoint, and supports linux/amd64 and linux/arm64.

docker run --rm \
  ghcr.io/othmaneblial/pyffmpegcore@sha256:c51cffe123e254650337e8973db4ab01587dbaa8ad08df77fee3c1ca3c08e5ca \
  doctor
docker run --rm \
  --volume "$PWD:/workspace" \
  --workdir /workspace \
  ghcr.io/othmaneblial/pyffmpegcore@sha256:c51cffe123e254650337e8973db4ab01587dbaa8ad08df77fee3c1ca3c08e5ca \
  pipeline run pipeline.json --receipt-dir receipts

Do not use a mutable tag for repeatable automation. The digest above is the public linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 index built from revision 96654e3 after the runtime and vulnerability gates passed. The repository Action uses the same digest by default.

Build inputs

• base: python:3.12.14-slim-bookworm@sha256:0f5b26b9518d002b6173fd61daad821fa340635ebfec5bba471013f9ca114579
• FFmpeg Debian package: 7:5.1.9-0+deb12u1
• Python package: the exact checked-out repository revision recorded by OCI labels and provenance
• runtime user: numeric UID/GID 10001

The base digest is immutable. Debian dependency resolution can still change when a security update is published, so the pushed image digest, SBOM, and provenance—not a local rebuild—are the release identity.

The final runtime removes the checked-out source tree and Python packaging tools (pip, setuptools, and wheel) after installing PyFFmpegCore. Those tools are build inputs, not runtime features. CI proves their absence before publishing an image.

Publication gate

The container workflow:

1. builds an amd64 candidate;
2. proves the non-root user, doctor, and synthetic smoke test;
3. blocks on HIGH or CRITICAL Trivy findings for which an upstream fix exists;
4. publishes an amd64/arm64 OCI image only after those gates;
5. attaches BuildKit SBOM and maximum provenance;
6. creates a GitHub artifact attestation for the pushed digest.

A weekly scheduled run rebuilds and scans without publishing. Dependency or base updates require a reviewed pull request and a new immutable digest. Container maintenance is owned by the repository maintainer.

The complete SARIF intentionally also reports Debian/CPython advisories whose Fixed Version is empty. Those findings cannot be patched inside this image without replacing the supported upstream package source. They are explicitly triaged as accepted upstream risk in GitHub code scanning, not silently discarded. When Trivy starts reporting a fixed version, the separate blocking scan fails until the base or package is upgraded and a new digest is published.

Licensing and codecs

PyFFmpegCore source is MIT. The container also redistributes Debian's FFmpeg package and its transitive libraries under their own licenses, including GPL/LGPL components. Debian copyright files remain installed under /usr/share/doc, and the generated SBOM inventories the installed packages. Codec patent rules vary by jurisdiction; image users remain responsible for their media and deployment context.

The review baseline is the Debian Bookworm FFmpeg package source and copyright metadata. A future custom FFmpeg build requires a fresh license, codec, security-update, and maintenance review before it can replace this image.

Verification

docker build --file Containerfile --tag pyffmpegcore:local .
docker run --rm pyffmpegcore:local smoke-test --json

gh attestation verify \
  oci://ghcr.io/othmaneblial/pyffmpegcore@sha256:c51cffe123e254650337e8973db4ab01587dbaa8ad08df77fee3c1ca3c08e5ca \
  --repo OthmaneBlial/pyffmpegcore

The workflow's container-evidence-* artifact contains the doctor report, smoke report, FFmpeg version, a complete SARIF vulnerability report, and the filtered HIGH/CRITICAL JSON publication gate for every build.